Capital account liberalization in China : risk analysis for Asia Pacific : the impact of China's financial and monetary reforms on its neighbors by Ho, Sue
Title
Capital account liberalization in China : risk analysis for Asia
Pacific : the impact of China's financial and monetary reforms on
its neighbors
Author(s) Ho, Sue
Citation
Ho, S.. (2015). Capital account liberalization in China : risk
analysis for Asia Pacific : the impact of China's financial and
monetary reforms on its neighbors. (Thesis). University of Hong
Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR.
Issued Date 2015
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/246721
Rights
The author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent rights)
and the right to use in future works.; This work is licensed under
a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
4.0 International License.
Sue Ho Hong Kong University Page | 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION IN CHINA: RISK ANALYSIS 
FOR ASIA PACIFIC 
The impact of China’s financial and monetary reforms on its neighbors  
 
  
Sue Ho Hong Kong University Page | 2 
Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 3 
CHINA ............................................................................................................................................................ 3 
China: Financial System ............................................................................................................................ 4 
China: Monetary System ........................................................................................................................... 6 
RISKS ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................................. 8 
Hong Kong as an International Financial Center ....................................................................................... 8 
The Implications of Free Capital Flows ................................................................................................... 10 
Valuation Distortions .......................................................................................................................... 11 
Increased Capital Flow Volatility and Sudden Stops ........................................................................... 12 
Currency Reserves ............................................................................................................................... 14 
The Role of the PBOC .............................................................................................................................. 15 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................................................................. 17 
APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................................... 19 
Table A: China’s total system loans relative to the US; corresponding M2 and GDP growth ................ 19 
Table B: China: Government’s debt obligations ..................................................................................... 20 
Table C: Equity market turnover and average days turnover assuming a USD38.4bn capital inflow .... 21 
Table D: Bond market size relative to 1% move in China’s foreign exchange reserve ........................... 22 
Table E: Countries’ external debt and their breakdown ......................................................................... 22 
Table F: Chinn-Ito (2006) financial openness ranking for Asian countries ............................................. 23 
Table G: Countries’ foreign exchange reserves relative to the size of their economies ........................ 23 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................ 25 
 
 
  
Sue Ho Hong Kong University Page | 3 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION IN CHINA: RISK ANALYSIS 
FOR ASIA PACIFIC 
INTRODUCTION 
Already the world’s second-largest economy, the pace of change in China has come as a surprise 
to even the most bullish of all forecasters. This year, China’s financial reforms continue, most 
recently with the launch of the Hong Kong-Shanghai Stock Connect, and a further widening of 
RMB trading band. As International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDR) review 
closes, China’s reforms are likely to speed up.  
We believe that it is important to examine the impact of the country’s financial reforms to better 
understand the effects it will have on the political economies of its neighbors. Based on numerical 
assessment we assume that China’s sheer size will have a significant impact on the region. In 
particular, we look at the impact of China’s financial liberalization: 1) on Hong Kong as an 
international financial center; 2) its capital flows on regional markets; and 3) examine the global 
implications of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). As Polanyi (1957) argues, “the human 
economy… is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-economic”, that 
inevitably, politics, economics and the institutions which operate within it, are interdependent, with 
the negative (or positive) impact arising from economic and financial decisions likely to have wider 
political implications. Changes in China’s capital account will have an impact on the political 
economy of neighboring Asia Pacific countries, and we hope that by examining some of these 
risks, steps can be taken in protection of regional economies in a globally integrated financial 
system. 
CHINA 
China is the largest economic development success of the past three decades. The country 
opened up its current account from the late 1970s by pursuing export led industrialization and 
pulling its population out of poverty and propelling it to the top of trade league tables to become 
the top trading partner of many of the world’s economies.  
However, having achieved “middle income” status by 2010, concerns abound that China may fall 
into what Kharas & Kohli (2011) call the “middle income trap” – the “inability to compete with either 
low-wage economies or highly skilled advanced economies”. This has been cited as a state of 
economic dysfunction that has entrapped most of Latin America as well as some Asian economies 
such as the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. Kharas & Kohli make three recommendations:  
specialization, total factor productivity (TFP) growth and decentralization. After having achieved 
specialization 1  in manufacturing and gains in TFP 2 , China seems to be on the path of 
“decentralization”, by way of liberalizing its markets. Its move towards a more liberalized capital 
                                                          
1 Nahm and Steinfeld (2012) finds that China successfully managed to cultivate “innovative manufacturing”. 
2 Xu and Yu (2012) finds that China achieved TFP growth, but may have reached a point in its urbanization levels 
whereby negative externalities may slow TFP growth; Xu, Y., and Yu, S., “Total Factor Productivity among Cities in 
China: Estimation and Explanation”, Economics Program Working Paper Series, The Conference Board and 
University of Groningen, March 2012; accessed here. 
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account started in 2000, with a target to move closer towards a market-, service- and 
consumption-based economy.  
The academic world brims with literature on this front – from merits and disadvantages, to the 
matter of sequencing, and finally on risks of financial, economic and institutional crises. Henry 
(2003) argues that capital account liberalization means a lower cost of capital, and increases in 
capital stock and output per worker. Fischer (1997) credits free capital flows for the strong 
economic growth of emerging economies, and argues that capital will inadvertently seek higher 
rates of return, therefore driving it towards emerging economies. Dornbusch (1997) notes the 
tendency for capital controls to be badly managed; to which Cooper (1997) concedes, but 
disagrees on the point of markets being an efficient allocator of capital. Rodrik (1998) highlights 
our lack of knowledge of the workings and impacts of free capital flows and cautions against its 
adoption as a one-stop solution. Wade (2000) notes the vulnerability of the East Asian economies 
to financial crises as a result of a liberalized capital account. Bhagwati (1998) points out the 
susceptibility of free capital flows to shocks and crises, although Anjaria (1998) retorts that 
international financial liberalization has brought forward profound economic development to the 
world, and that booms and busts can be controlled by managing its transition with the participation 
of institutions; along with the need for “proper sequencing”. McKinnon and Pill (1996) point out 
the tendency for over borrowing on liberalization and Woo et al (2000) present their quantitative 
findings that the Asian financial crisis was not caused by deteriorating macroeconomic 
fundamentals, but rather was a result of financial contagion. Eichengreen (2001) finds that there 
is evidence supporting both the pros and cons of capital liberalization, although the benefits can 
be uneven (Arteta & Eichengreen 2001). Prasad and Rajan (2008) proposes a “pragmatic” 
approach to capital account liberalization, although without a specific sequencing offer. Chinn and 
Ito (2002) analyze the factors for successful capital liberalization and find that financial openness 
and development is tightly linked with legal and institutional development.  
Whether China is ready for capital account liberalization has similarly amassed a large volume of 
literature. Aramaki (2006) draws experience from Japan’s experience, and recommends that 
China staggers reforms through a sequence of trade liberalization, capital account liberalization 
and finance liberalization, and recommended gradualism as a due course of action. Lardy and 
Douglass (2011) establish three preconditions for convertibility – a strong domestic banking 
system, developed domestic financial markets and an equilibrium exchange rate – and finds that 
“China does not yet meet any of the conditions necessary for convertibility”. However, Huang et 
al (2011) argue that conditions in China are in fact already favorable for capital account 
liberalization, and that deferring it would instead cost China an opportune moment. Yang (2006) 
argues that further embedding of China into the world economy is likely to incur some short-term 
costs to other developing economies but would be beneficial in the long term.  
We take a brief look at China’s financial and monetary system before examining select risks of 
the country’s capital account liberalization. 
China: Financial System 
China’s financial system is generally recognized as a “two-tier” banking system, comprising of 
banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) 3. The sector went through four phases of 
change, first in the late 1970s with the establishment of the banking system, followed by the 
                                                          
3 These include policy banks, joint stock banks, rural banks, commercial banks, city banks and foreign banks 
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establishment of the two-tier system in 1984. The third phase, starting in 1988, expanded the role 
of NBFIs, and the fourth in 1992, further expanded the scope of existing and new banks (Mehran 
1996). Xu (1998)4 gives a succinct summary of the vastness of China’s financial reforms, from its 
opening up in 1979 through to 1991, by which time “a reformed financial system had emerged 
from the mono-banking system previously adopted as part of the central planning mechanism… 
main areas of reforms [were] banking system reforms, the development of the financial markets, 
and the reform of the central bank and its conduct of monetary policy”. The country has had to 
grow its centrally planned bank to provide coverage for the entire country, and at the same time 
solve both intended and unintended conflicts of reform. Over the years, China saw significant 
financial asset expansion, especially through 2005-09 (see Appendix, table A), far outstripping 
real economic growth, which enhanced financial institutions’ influence over the economy. We 
have also seen reports of wasted investments, what with the uninhabited, fully built residential 
towns5, falling commercial property pricing6, unconnected wind farms7 and unprofitable toll roads8.  
Tam (1995) argues that China has not kept pace with the financial reform that is needed but points 
out that “it is indeed vital to understand the fundamental characteristics of the changing financial 
and monetary processes so that a more realistic assessment and policy recommendation can be 
made”. Xu (1998), however, notes that whilst financial reforms, in conjunction with economic 
reforms, have paved the way for strong economic growth, excess liquidity and mispricing remains 
an issue and that financial instruments and intermediaries need to be properly regulated and 
supervised. Further, Lardy (2003) is of the view that China’s financial system is unlikely to allocate 
resources efficiently without major reforms of the existing financial institutions, and changes in 
commercial credit culture; and Debray-Boyreau & Wei (2005) finds that capital mobility within 
China is low, even as the state “allocates capital systematically away from more productive 
regions towards less productive ones”, thereby negatively affecting economic efficiency and 
growth. This is significant, as the health of the financial system is critical to maintaining the 
economic health and stability of the country. This is not lost on the market, as many continue to 
predict a financial crisis for China9. After all, financial booms and busts are a signature trademark 
of a market economy, and as Kindleberger and Aliber (2010) note, these have been followed by 
recessions. 
Small signs of acknowledgement are coming from China with the Xi government’s national audit 
of 2012, the results of which were announced at the end of 2013. Total government debts totaled 
RMB17.89tn (see Appendix, table B for a full breakdown10). This, along with a recently announced 
program for swapping local government debt into market-priced bonds11 seems to indicate the 
government’s level of commitment in tackling its debt issue. China persists with financial reforms, 
with the last five-year plan (its 12th, which covers the period 2011-15) emphasizing the needs to 
address rising income inequality by way of rising minimum wage and increasing social security12. 
                                                          
4 Xu, X., “China’s Financial System under Transition”, Macmillan Press, 1998 (p154)  
5 The Economist, “Haunted housing”, 16 November 2013; accessed here 
6 Sender, H., “China commercial property carries biggest risks for investors”, FT, 24 June 2014; accessed here 
7 Kwok, V., “Weaknesses in Chinese wind power”, Forbes, 20 July 2009; accessed here 
8 Cox, H., “China’s toll roads – who goes there?”, FT, 29 November 2013; accessed here 
9 Basu, P., “China’s crisis is coming – the only question is how big it will be”, FT, 7 April 2014; accessed here 
10 China National Audit Office, Dec 2013; accessed here  
11 The Economist, “Finance Ministry moves ease local government money troubles”, March 2015; accessed here; 
The Economist, “Defusing a bomb”, 11 March 2015; accessed here 
12 “China’s 12’th five year plan: Overview”, KPMG, March 2011; accessed here  
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The commitment of the Chinese government towards this is further shown most recently through 
the Deposit Insurance Scheme (paving the way for interest-rate liberalization, and also some 
protection for deposits in the event of any banking failure), state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms 
(to change lending behavior) and the Hong Kong-Shanghai connect program (to increase 
investment opportunities). 
Huang and Bosler (2014)13 argue that China’s debt issues are exaggerated, simply because there 
are no systematic risks that the government is unable to mitigate. Similarly, Zhang and Barnett 
(2014) agree that whilst China’s fiscal vulnerabilities and local government financing risks are 
material, they can be contained. The argument can also be made that the banking system has 
been reformed, and external debt is more than four times covered by reserves14. However, one 
cannot write off the risks of a domestic financial crisis, and a spillover of such to regional 
economies in an integrated financial system.  
China: Monetary System 
Progress of China’s monetary system reform continues to be dwarfed by developments and 
reforms of its financial system. The monetary system is crucial in terms of price setting, market 
development and financial liberalization (Mehran et al 1996). Having already set the path of global 
integration, the Chinese government has been much more proactive in its efforts to 
internationalize the RMB post the global financial crisis (GFC), as the government could see this 
as a way to hedge itself against global financial risks and market fluctuations, and allow the 
country greater influence over the global monetary system15.  
However, there are certain requirements that a currency needs to satisfy before it is 
“internationalized”. Chinn and Frankel (2008) list four requisite factors: 1) the relative size of its 
output and trade to the global trade; 2) the breadth and depth of the country’s financial markets; 
3) the confidence in the value of the currency; and 4) “network externalities”, that is, international 
use of the currency, or economies of scale. However, they also note that inertia, the tendency of 
one to use today what they used yesterday, can be a delaying factor in internationalizing a 
currency, even if it meets the four requirements. Separately, The IMF’s SDR status also has 
similar, but different requirements16. Gao and Yu (2012) find that the RMB is at a very early stage 
of internationalization given its use outside of China is marginal, even if its neighbors and trading 
partners should be holding higher levels of RMB in its reserves (Ito 2011 in Kroeber 2013). 
Currently, China’s monetary system is considered to be closed as capital outflows are tightly 
controlled but capital inflows occur. Onshore currency is denoted as “CNY” (Chinese Yuan), whilst 
its offshore currency is “CNH”. The two can be thought of as separate pools of money, as pricing 
                                                          
13 Huang, Y., Bosler, C., “China’s debt dilemma: deleveraging while generating growth”, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 18 September 2014; accessed here  
14 According to 2013 World Bank data, accessed here  
15 This is largely the argument made by Zhou Xiaochuan, PBOC governor, in many of his speeches and articles. 
Governor Zhou’s argument is based on a concept similar to the Triffin trilemma, whereby the economies of the 
world is dependent on the US Federal Reserve (and subsequently the US economy) to fund it, even if the US 
economy cannot possibly grow at the same rate as the world economy indefinitely. This was also popularized by 
Paul Krugman as the “Dollar trap”. Zhou Xiaochuan, “Zhou Xiaochuan’s statement on reforming the international 
monetary system”, CFR, 23 March 2009; accessed here; “IMFC statement by Zhou Xiaochuan”, IMFC, 18 April 
2015; accessed here 
16 “Criteria for broadening the SDR currency basket”, IMF, September 2011; accessed here 
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differs – the former is determined by the Central Bank daily fixing, and the latter by market-based 
supply and demand, although guided by the daily fixing. The conversion between CNY and CNH 
and vice versa is controlled via the Qualified Financial Institutional Investor (QFII) and RMB 
Qualified Financial Institutional Investor (RQFII) programs17. However, if China achieves full 
convertibility and capital liberalization, these two pools would likely converge, and we would see 
no pricing differential. 
Efforts in embedding China’s monetary system with the international system can be seen in the 
liquidity and relative success of the CNH market. The PBoC has also been signing swap lines 
with other central banks around the world, along with designating clearing centers and other 
banks as custodians.  
Offshore RMB in Hong Kong  The UK’s growing share in CNH trading  
 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters  Source: Thomson Reuters FX Matching 
At the domestic level, a freely convertible currency will lower foreign-currency risk (both translation 
and transactional risks) for Chinese trade participants (around 80% of China’s external trade 
continues to be settled in foreign currency in 201418). At a (financial) system level, this is also 
beneficial to the development of the country’s capital market, where it could see lower cost of 
capital in RMB. Capital mobility is also likely to speed up financial reforms in the domestic market, 
provided that the market has reached a certain level of maturity to be able to absorb shocks that 
liberalization inherently brings (Fishcer 1998, Henry 2003). 
At an international level, the achievement of reserve currency status will bring China lower 
transaction costs and can allow China to borrow at lower costs despite higher levels of debt19. 
This benefit is not dissimilar to that enjoyed by the USD in its dominance in global use, especially 
in the demand for US Treasury as foreign currency reserves, whereby over 64% of the world’s 
reserves are in USD (USD3.8tn)20 and what is known as the “petrodollar”, through which the 
                                                          
17 Liu, C., “CNH market – a burgeoning offshore RMB market”, Bank of China, September 2011; accessed here  
18 Kynge, J., and Noble, J., “China: turning away from the dollar”, FT, 9 December 2014; accessed here 
19 A simple explanation is such that countries are in essence “forced” to hold the one reserve currency, thereby 
creating infinite demand.   
20 Prasad, E., “The dollar reigns supreme, by default”, IMF, March 2014; accessed here; reserve data from COFER, 
IMF; accessed here 
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global oil market is settled in one day (USD9.2bn21). This generates an equivalent amount of 
demand for the currency, albeit the US makes up only 20.7% of real commodity demand. Further, 
it is in China’s interest to minimize currency volatility risks itself22.  
On the balance of the literature presented above, we are inclined to agree with Singh (2003) and 
Bhagwati (1998) that capital liberalization is not in all instances appropriate, and even if 
appropriate, needs to be selective and gradual. We also share Lardy’s (2003) opinion that China 
is not completely prepared for capital account liberalization. However, external pressures and the 
evolution of its financial and monetary systems would appear to have hit a ceiling for domestic 
reforms, and a larger push is needed for the system to make the next leap. Therefore, it is a step 
that needs to be well managed – a task easier said than done – and would likely cause the rise 
of volatility in regional markets, impacting relations, economies and politics in the Asia Pacific 
region.  
RISKS ANALYSIS 
The case for and against capital account convertibility is popularly debated amongst economists. 
Popular advocates of capital liberalization include Fischer (1998) and Anjaria (1998) who believe 
that markets are most efficient at capital allocation, and thus all markets should be left to their 
own devices, with minimal controls and politicking. On the other hand, Wade (2000), Rodrik 
(1998) and Prasad (2008) argue that whilst capital account liberalization can have some benefits, 
but when evaluated over time, taking into account other externalities, does not necessarily net off 
positively; even Keynes recognized the destabilizing effects of the aggregate impact of individual 
decisions. 
The successful liberalization of China’s financial system should see its economy benefit from 
factors as highlighted by Fischer (1998), such as a more transparent pricing of systematic and 
unsystematic risk; better corporate governance and minority shareholder rights and protection. 
However, endogenous growth theorists would argue that TFP accumulation remains the key to 
economic growth (Romer 1986, Romer 1994). Bekaert & Lundblad (2011) show that factor 
productive growth remains more important than capital growth in spurring economic growth, than 
capital growth itself.  
Bearing in mind the above circumstances, we next evaluate the potential risks and changes facing 
the Asia Pacific countries as a result of China’s financial reforms.  
Hong Kong as an International Financial Center (IFC) 
China’s State Council announced plans in 2009 for Shanghai to become an international financial 
center by 2020, targeting for the city to become “a global center for innovation, transaction, pricing 
and clearing of RMB-denominated financial products by 2015”23. This was followed up this year 
with announcements of free-trade zones in Shanghai, to facilitate the registration process and 
ease of doing business for foreign companies24 . IFCs are important in carrying out pricing 
                                                          
21 In 2014, total crude oil demand was 92.05mbpd (US: 19.03mbpd), indicating annual demand of 33.138bn 
barrels. Average price for 2014 for Brent crude was USD100/bbl. 
22 Murphy and Wen (2009) presents a well-rounded argument for and against RMB internationalization and capital 
account liberalization. 
23 “Shanghai aims to be global financial center”, Xinhua, China Daily, 30 January 2012; accessed here 
24 “China announces plans for pilot free trade zones”, Xinhuanet, 20 April 2015; accessed here 
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discovery, clearing and settlement for liquid, transparent markets in currency trading. Domestic 
locations are important, given market hours. The liberalization of the Chinese market will require 
an IFC in the vicinity, if not domestically.  
However, there are many ambiguities pertaining to the achievement of such status, both from a 
legal perspective (Wells et al 2013) and from a monetary and a geographic (Yang et al 2010) (ie, 
in competition with Beijing) context. Elliot (2012)25 also took careful consideration of Shanghai 
from a competitive context, comparing it to New York, London, Frankfurt and Paris to determine 
the factors needed for a successful climb to the top of the financial center ladder. Young et al 
(2009) outline the major benefits of IFCs as lower capital costs, less scope for currency and 
maturity mismatches and improvement in resource allocation; and review the competitive angle 
from an Asia Pacific perspective. Young et al also calls for “co-operative competition”, resulting in 
a form of “Asia IFC network”, with each specializing in their respective niches.  
Currently, Hong Kong and Shanghai share this role, given China’s dual pricing mechanism (see 
“China’s monetary system” above). However, parallel to capital account liberalization is the 
closing of pricing differentials, for example, to eliminate “onshore” and “offshore” pricing 
differential, and to facilitate global transactions under just one price. Similarly, the same would 
apply to equity markets – aside from raising money from a foreign market, there should be no 
reason for pricing and valuation differentials.  
Woo (2013)26 studied the development of an international reserve currency (IRC) and IFC, and 
surmised, based on cases of the US dollar (USD), British pound (GBP) and Japanese yen (JPY) 
that Shanghai needs to achieve Tier 1 IFC status before the currency can be considered an IRC; 
however once IRC status is achieved, Shanghai need not maintain its Tier 1 IFC status for the 
maintenance of IRC. The latter is based on his assessment of the fall of Tokyo as a top-tier IFC 
despite the relevance of the JPY as a reserve currency even until today. 
Shanghai’s achievement as an IFC is likely to have a significant impact on Hong Kong, which has 
developed its economy largely around trading and international finance, specifically China-related  
businesses27. The territory operates the world’s fourth-busiest container port28 and ranks third on 
the Global Financial Center Index29. As at the end of 2013, the finance industry drove 6.2% of 
Hong Kong’s employment, and 16.5% of its GDP30. When Tokyo as an IFC lost out to Hong Kong 
and Singapore over the period of 2008-14, 6,000 jobs in finance were lost (a 9.6% decline)31. 
Assuming that income averages HKD2.24mn (approx. USD288,181) for finance professionals in 
Hong Kong, we calculate that a 10% decline in Hong Kong’s banking sector would equate to an 
immediate 104bp decline in GDP growth 32 . It should be noted that the average finance 
                                                          
25 Quoted from American Chamber of Shanghai report, 
26 Woo WT (胡永泰), “RMB, Shanghai and China’s financial reform /人民币、上海与中国金融改革之路”, CN stock, 19 
November 2013; accessed here; published in Mandarin. Woo acknowledges other factors to the creation of an IRC 
and IFC. Namely, an IFC needs to have openness, depth, breadth and stability. Woo balances the capital account 
liberalization question, but noting the benefits of liberalization, but cautions against its pace.  
27 Of the 50 constituents of the Hang Seng Index, 25 are Mainland businesses. This number does not include 
businesses with significant Mainland interests (>20% of revenues), in which case, would total 37 of the 50. 
28 “Top 50 world container ports”, World Shipping Council, accessed here  
29 “Global Financial Centre Index”, Wikipedia; accessed here  
30 According to Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong; accessed here and here  
31 Regional Japan labor statistics can be accessed here; Tokyo is located in Southern Kanto 
32 Calculations performed on 2013 data, as provided by the Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong;  
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professional earns more than four times that of the average worker in Hong Kong – leading to a 
significant erosion of purchasing power in this case.  
As Elliot (2012) notes, an IFC is more than just the hiring of financial professionals33. Greater 
(second order) impacts would also be felt across other sectors, such as in professional services 
(which support the financial industry, including accountancy, law and taxation services), retail 
services (eg, food & beverage, shopping, property services) and capital values (eg, 
housing/property market, stock market demand).  
Donald (2014) analyzes the situation in Hong Kong and Shanghai and concludes that it will be 
some time before Shanghai catches up to Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s retains several advantages, 
namely, lower tax rates, free flow of information, political stability, a corruption-free government, 
timely infrastructure and communication, rule of law and an independent judiciary, business-
friendly economic policy, lack of exchange controls, free-port status and a “level-playing field”. 
Similarly, Yang et al (2010) concede that given there are currently more weaknesses facing 
Shanghai in its bid to become an IFC, Hong Kong is likely to persist as the main IFC for China, 
but highlighting the inherent competition between Hong Kong and Shanghai as they compete with 
each other.  
We believe that whilst it may be the case that Shanghai currently lags Hong Kong in many 
technical aspects, the Chinese government would inevitably like to see a city with the RMB as the 
fundamental trading currency achieve Tier-1 IFC status, even if the achievement of this falls 
beyond 2020. Hong Kong, of course, has various options should this eventuate. We see three 
options: 1) Hong Kong can carve out a specific niche in finance, focusing specifically in certain 
segments, for example, trading (import-export), which it has had a long history of, having always 
been a port city; 2) Hong Kong could look into diversifying its economy away from finance, into 
areas such as technology or other services – this would require the government to invest in 
necessary infrastructure (both physical and soft-skill based) to facilitate for this; and 3) Hong Kong 
could consider adopting the RMB as its own currency, thereby qualifying as an IFC with RMB 
participation. Of the three, the latter is easiest to implement and with the highest level of economic 
benefit. However, it is also likely the option with the most political resistance, given political identity 
issues typically associated with currencies34. Much efforts in socialization will be needed by both 
the Chinese and Hong Kong governments to encourage the adoption of the RMB in Hong Kong.  
The Implications of Free Capital Flows  
The key tenet of capital account liberalization is the free flow of capital in both inflows and 
outflows. As examined in the “China” section, there are arguments both for and against capital 
account liberalization, with supporters arguing for the more efficient allocation of capital, and 
opponents pointing to flaws in free markets and the tendency for crises. In essence, supporters 
                                                          
33 They include: the benefit of having the most important and lucrative deals occurring in that city, the 
employment of best bankers and traders, the increased need for ancillary businesses such as lawyers, accountants, 
actuaries, specialist insurers and others, the need for other services and employment as a result of increased 
finance employment, the use of the local currency as a matter of convenience. 
34 As evidenced by the differing attitudes towards the adoption of the Euro in the Eurozone. Some articles on this 
issue include Muller-Peters, A., “The significance of national pride and national identity to the attitude toward the 
single European currency: A Europe-wide comparison”, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol 19, Issue 6, Dec 1998; 
and Risse, T., et al “To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and identity politics in the European Union”, European 
Journal of International Relations, June 1999, vol 5, no 2, June 1999 
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believe that an integrated global financial market will see lower cost of capital, lower transaction 
costs and a more efficient resource allocation process. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that 
this has not been the case in reality, especially as markets are flawed, with a strong tendency to 
either react slowly, or over-react (creating booms and busts). Furthermore, market participants 
tend to over-borrow/lend, and flighty short-term capital can be ruinous for economies. Lucas 
(1990) makes a particularly good point that capital does not always flow from rich (low rate of 
returns) to poor (higher rates of return) countries due to differences in human capital, market 
imperfections and political risks.  
A well-studied risk of financial liberalization is that of financial risks. Prasad and Rajan (2008), 
Aizenman et al and Moschella (2010) analyze financial crises in liberalizing economies, for 
example, in Latin America, South East Asia and Korea, and find that there are no clear cut benefits 
in capital account liberalization. In particular, Aizenman (2013) finds a disproportionate skew in 
the negative impact on growth funded by short-term debt as opposed to equity. This view is 
similarly shared by Joyce (2011)35, whose empirical study warns that a fixed exchange regime 
and heavy borrowings are more likely to set the stage for a banking crisis.  
China’s banking and financial system remain immature, despite a restructuring in 2004 of the 
country’s non-performing loans (NPLs), bringing the number of NPL down to 1.23% by the end of 
2014. However, the figure remains contentious, as many argue that due to differences in NPL 
recognition36, the true figure could easily be double or triple that of the current stated figure. 
Furthermore, the economy is beset by issues of cheap SOE loans as a result of an assumed 
implicit guarantee from the government to assume the debt burden should financial difficulties be 
encountered. Thus, on China’s bumpy road to economic advancement, it will be susceptible to 
multiple corrections in its economy. 
Therefore, we have the conundrum of increased Chinese capital mobility and a more influential 
participant in global capital markets, but because of the size of its market, and amplified impact 
of both its successes and failures. We see three concerns in free capital flows – prolonged 
valuation distortions, increased volatility and the implications for neighboring countries in building 
their currency reserves.  
Valuation Distortions 
As at the end of 2014, the Central Bank had assets equivalent to USD5.45tn on its balance sheet, 
and foreign currency reserves of USD3.84tn. As widely reported, the latter is mostly invested in 
low-yielding US Treasury bills, although China Investment Corporation (CIC) was founded in 2007 
to invest some of the country’s foreign reserves. Some of CIC’s highest profile foreign investments 
have been in Morgan Stanley and Uralkali, although most investments still retain a home bias.  
We perform a sensitivity analysis, assuming a 1% outward flow (cUSD38.4bn) of China’s 
international reserves into equity markets around the region, and find that Japan has the best 
capability to absorb a capital outflow of this magnitude, although this is almost two days’37 average 
value traded. Mongolia would be the most adversely affected, as its equity market only has an 
average turnover of USD100,000. The faster a market can absorb the volume, the lesser of an 
                                                          
35 Joyce, J., “Financial globalization and banking crises in emerging markets”, Open Economies Review Nov 2011 
36 Wildau, G., “Office data mask China’s banking problems” August 2014, Financial Times; accessed here: Walter, 
C., Howie, F., “China’s disappearing bad loans”, September 2014, accessed here 
37 Based on its 6-monthly average 
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impact on pricing. Furthermore, a delay in execution of the order will also create information 
leakage. Our analysis indicates that all major equity markets are unable to turn over that 
magnitude of inflows without affecting pricing – we can see that it takes Japan 1.8 days (fastest) 
to the second-fastest, Korea, at over a week. Hong Kong and Australia follows at around 8 days 
and 10 days, respectively. (see Appendix,  table C for tabulated results.)  
The bond markets are similarly constrained by the inability to absorb such flows. Appendix, Table 
D tabulates the sizes of various Asian bond markets (both sovereign and corporate) relative to 
the same 1% outflow in the Chinese foreign exchange reserve. They show that a 1% capital 
outflow can have a significant impact on a large portion of the domestic bond market.   
As noted in Furceri et al (2012), “large capital inflows may also lead to upward pressure on asset 
prices, increase the exposure of the economy to foreign liabilities and fuel foreign-financed credit 
booms, which may subsequently turn to busts when capital flows are reversed”. The inability to 
absorb these flows will likely cause distortions in pricing, that is, overvaluation when China 
experiences capital outflows, and undervaluation in cases of capital inflows. Perversely, in times 
of over- (under-) valuation, this also implies that cost of capital would come down (go up), as the 
market is fueled (strained) with liquidity. On one hand, this can lead to over-borrowing, with 
domestic companies beholden to foreign lenders and macroeconomic instability, with resulting 
case such as the Latin American debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis. On the other hand, 
capital outflows from an open economy can mean a sudden withdrawal of capital, starving the 
country of what was previously widely available capital for investment.  
Whilst trade liberalization in relation to economic and national income growth is broadly agreed 
on to be beneficial for both domestic and foreign economies, the same cannot be said about 
capital account liberalization. Rodrik (1998) shows no significant relationship between capital 
account liberalization and growth, and neither for investment growth and capital account 
liberalization, although Bekaert et al (2005), through a larger sample size and time horizon, show 
the contrary. Bhagwati (1998) makes the distinction between trade as stock and capital as flow – 
and hence cannot be treated the same. We believe that free capital flow out of China is likely to 
see increased asset pricing volatility for its neighbors.  
Increased Capital Flow Volatility and Sudden Stops 
Consistent with the finding in the previous section on over-/under-valuation, we are also likely to 
see increased volatility with free capital flows, as capital flows are flighty. Stiglitz (2000) best sums 
up this condition: “… capital market liberalization is systematically associated with greater 
instability… capital flows are markedly pro-cyclical, exacerbating economic fluctuations, when 
they do not actually cause them”.  
A recent example is the move in the Hong Kong-listed China shares (“H-shares”), where the Hang 
Seng China Enterprise Index (HSCEI) rallied by 29% over the course of one month on the 
expectation that greater outflows would materialize as it was announced that domestic mutual 
funds would be allowed to participate in the Hong Kong-Shanghai Stock connect, regardless of 
the QDII scheme. The rally occurred despite any real actual mutual fund flows from China (as at 
end-May 2015, only one mutual fund recorded usage)38. Most recently, the index is down 25% 
                                                          
38 CSRC announcement; accessed here  
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from recent highs. This has caused market confidence to weaken, causing asset pricing to decline 
globally39.  
Price volatility, whilst a profitable condition for traders, is not a robust condition for longer-term 
investment business planning. China’s neighbors may find it more difficult to make investment 
and business decisions under volatile and uncertain conditions, the lack thereof which could cost 
economies growth opportunities. This is further exacerbated by the concept of “sudden stops”, a 
condition described by Mendoza (2002) as “… a sharp reversal in private capital inflows, or a shift 
to large outflows, and a corresponding sharp reversal from large current account deficits into 
much smaller deficits or small surpluses. These abrupt reversals in foreign financing in turn forced 
sharp contractions of domestic production and private expenditures; collapses in the real 
exchange rate, asset prices and the relative price of non-tradable goods in terms of tradable 
goods; and sharp declines in credit to the private sector. In several cases, sudden stops followed 
by periods during which external deficits widened gradually, the relative price of non-tradables 
and the real exchange rate appreciated sharply, and economic activity and asset prices boomed, 
often in tandem with explicit or implicit managed exchange rate regimes”. Calvo and Reinhart 
(1999) further illustrate the concept by explaining the two ways in which this can cause a 
prolonged contractionary impact on aggregate demand: 1) the “Keynesian” method, whereby a 
downward adjustment in price and wages causes a similar downward adjustment in aggregate 
demand; and 2) the more complex “Fisherian” channel, whereby it impacts the financial system, 
creating a more lending-adverse economic environment, if not one starved of capital. This channel 
essentially implies both a financial and a currency crisis. In summary, free capital flows stand to 
cause heightened volatility, with the prospect of “sudden stops”. The phenomenon is not 
conditional upon the health of the economy, and is indiscriminant of geography; instead, 
economies will be trapped by the perception held by capital-holders. This is likely what is in store 
for China’s smaller neighbors in times of extreme volatility. 
Appendix, Table E lists the external debt of various Asian economies. We note that in particular, 
Indonesia and the Philippines have a high level of external debt, and both are issued at the 
sovereign level. Banks in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand also utilize foreign 
funding, as depicted by their relatively large proportion of foreign debt use. The balance is issued 
by other corporates. According to Chinn and Ito (2006)40, Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand 
and Japan are completely open economies. Mongolia, Australia and Korea do not fall very far 
behind, and the rest of the region scores between 0 and 0.5 (Appendix, Table F). Thus, volatility 
and sudden stop risks will be particularly significant for Hong Kong and Singapore, but also for 
New Zealand, Australia and Korea41.  
Policy recommendations have centered on two positions. First, the “isolationist” stance, implying 
some form of capital controls. Stiglitz (2000) recommend for capital flows intervention, with a 
specific focus on outflows. Furceri (2012) examines the differences in flows and surmises that 
policy action needs to vary depending on the type of capital flows – with debt inflows resulting in 
the largest “bonanza” effect. The second stance is that of the “internationalist” position, whereby 
the economy in crisis adopts a hard currency, namely, “dollarization”. Mendoza (2002) cites two 
key benefits: 1) lower transaction costs (doing away with monetary and exchange rate policy for 
                                                          
39 Though it should be noted that fears of “Grexit” was occurring about the same time 
40 Full data set accessed here 
41 No bond data for Hong Kong, though it would be reasonable to assume that it would be impacted in any capital 
flow volatility, as Hong Kong have a fixed peg to the USD and hence follows the monetary policy of the US. 
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the trouble economy); and 2) increased creditability. Calvo and Reinhart (1999) also state that 
dollarization essentially removes the problem, in that, the removal of the local currency eliminates 
the need to defend one to begin with.  
We do not believe the internationalist / dollarization approach is viable nor logical. First, 
dollarization would imply the need for an economy to surrender both its currency and its monetary 
policy and adopt USD as its fundamental currency and US monetary policy as its domestic interest 
rate. In other words, domestic interest-rate pricing would be determined by US monetary policy. 
Political resistance aside, this is likely to cause a mismatch between fiscal and monetary 
conditions, as it is highly likely that the US condition will differ from that of the domestic economy. 
It would also mean a loss of a policy tool for the domestic policy maker.  
Second, dollarization would imply that the US money supply would need to grow in tandem with 
the needs of other economies – it is unclear how this is possible in the long term, as money supply 
in the rest of the world should grow at a rate corresponding to their domestic growth rates, which, 
for emerging markets, is usually at a higher rate than the US. Technically speaking, the US would 
not be able to fund global “dollarization”.  
Therefore, China’s neighbors should urge China to pace its capital account liberalization and for 
intervention should it be justified in order to regulate destructive, speculative capital flows to 
mitigate risks for both. Next, we look at the impact of a build-up of currency reserves as regional 
economies attempt to defend against volatile capital flows. We are also of the opinion that 
“reasonable” capital intervention for China’s neighbors would be the best policy tool in the 
circumstance of an emergency. One of the methods involved is in the build-up of foreign currency 
reserves to combat hard times, should they come. The implications of this is examined in the next 
section. 
Currency Reserves 
In order to combat a sudden withdrawal from their economies, governments are likely to build up 
significant foreign currency reserves. Currently, many Asia economies have built sizable foreign 
currency reserves as a proportion of their GDP. Appenix, Table G shows the different countries’ 
foreign currency reserves relative to their respective GDPs, over 1996-2004. It is evident that the 
region has learnt the lesson from the Asian financial crisis and built their reserves as a precaution. 
We note particularly large increases for Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.  
The buildup of currency reserves requires purchase of foreign exchange, thereby the selling of 
domestic currency. This can also be accumulated with a trade surplus, retaining foreign currency 
gained from trade. Whilst there is not a specific need42, the economy is likely to run a current 
account surplus. There are no specific disadvantages to holding currency reserves, although that 
does mean that a significant portion of a country’s wealth is not being put to productive economic 
use.  
The accumulation of currency reserves does place appreciation pressure on major reserve 
currencies, such as the USD. Reserve data show a compounded growth rate of 24% per annum 
over 1996-2014 for countries in Asia Pacific ex-China, 52.9% including China, compared to GDP 
for the US for the same period at 6.4%. This is a severe mismatch in that it sends strong capital 
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flows to the US in contrast with its economic performance. Whilst Asia might suffer from a lack of 
liquidity, the US may enjoy too much liquidity.  
This phenomenon is of course not new, as pointed out in Triffin (1960), although his critique is of 
the Bretton Woods System. The logic still applies today – with the US continuing to enjoy the 
privilege of being considered a “safe asset”. Easy credit will fund the US in normal times, but it 
will mean that in times of crisis, it will also need extraordinarily expansionary tactics, with inflation 
becoming a much more focal threat in recoveries. On the contrary, smaller neighboring countries 
will also be unable to escape from these capital flows. The paradox of our current monetary 
system will only continue to sustain as long as major economies such as the US stand to provide 
liquidity. This risk of dependency has no doubt led to PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s call for 
reform of the international monetary system43, and a formal request for the RMB to be included in 
the SDR basket44. 
The implications of this is that smaller Asian economies, which continue to stand in the face of 
global imbalances, are likely to have to continue building their already large foreign currency 
reserves. They will need to diversify their holdings. We believe that the opening of China’s capital 
account will also make it necessary for these economies to purchase RMB for their reserves. In 
time, the RMB will become too big to not be “safe”, as it will be a significant part of the system. 
Thus, in addition to being exposed to economic and financial risks from the US, the Asia Pacific 
countries are now also likely to be exposed to that of China’s.  
The Role of the PBOC   
Central bank independence was not born till the late 1970s in the US, starting with the popular 
opinion that politicians held too much political interests to be able to handle both monetary and 
fiscal policies without peddling to the masses ultimately to the detriment of the state45. Before this, 
central banks existed on multiple platforms – private entities, public companies and as 
government entities. Since then, the role of a central bank has continued to change, with 
differences in structure and policy across the globe. The Federal Reserve (the Fed) in the US is 
the most well-known “independent central bank”, along with the Europe Central Bank (ECB), Bank 
of England (BOE) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ). Ex-Fed Chairman Blinder (1996) attempts to 
clarify that Fed policy makers: “… in times of acute market distress, the Fed stands ready to play 
its classic role as lender of last resort. In more normal times, the Fed worries about such things 
as the integrity of the markets, financial fragility, speculative bubbles, the value of a dollar, and a 
host of other things. As I used to say when I was Vice Chairman of the Fed, we get paid, though 
not very much, to worry about everything”.  
However, it is precisely the “everything” that has stirred debate as to how “independent” central 
banks should be, given the gargantuan impact that they will have on both domestic and 
international economies. Levy (1995) argues that central bankers have too much influence on the 
nation and have too wide a scope, for central banks to not be subject to greater scrutiny of the 
government. Blinder (1996) argues that the technicality of the field requires specialists, and its 
operation require autonomy from government, albeit with objectives decided by the country’s 
                                                          
43 Statement by Zhou Xiaochun at the International Monetary and Financial Committee, Oct 2014; accessed here 
44 Reuters, “China’s premier asks IMF to include yuan in SDR basket”, 23 March 2015; accessed here 
45 A quick history lesson on central bank independence can be accessed here 
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leaders. Berman and McNamara (1999) emphasize the importance of process over output in a 
democratic system and demand for greater accountability by, and regulation of the Fed46.  
Pre-GFC, the role of central banks have been in targeting inflation with the use of the policy rate, 
believing that the targeting of inflation was sufficient in managing the economy’s output gap and 
towards macro stability. With the onset of the GFC, it has been well noted that this is insufficient, 
and perhaps that the central banks’ targets and toolkits need to be expanded to include 
unemployment and direct market intervention, including both bonds and stock market purchases 
(Farmer 2010, Blanchard 2012).  
The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has also undergone several rounds of reforms since its 
inception on 1 December, 1948. However, the institution remains immature compared to other 
more established and experienced central banks. Due to differences in political systems, the 
PBoC is explicitly accountable to the State Council in China and does not have autonomy in policy 
targeting. Its targets, which can vary over time, are set annually and require approval from the 
State Council. The PBoC operates alongside the State Authority of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
who manages the foreign exchange and the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in coordinating and administrating 
policy.  
Ma and Li’s (2014)47 empirical study shows that China’s monetary policy transparency is low, and 
has been unable to communicate coherently48. A recent Barclays survey49 on Central Bank 
communication placed the PBOC twelfth out of the fourteen banks examined in terms of overall 
rating, which is based on ability to convey objectives, predictability in strategy and credibility. 
Anecdotally speaking, its communication been contrary to its actions, for example, the PBoC has 
been holding a “prudent” stance, despite having cut its benchmark rate successively this year. 
Furthermore, non-Mandarin speakers will need to wait a few weeks before its English policy 
announcements are published, making the PBoC much less friendlier in the eyes of market 
participants. 
The importance of central banks, including the PBoC, in an integrated global financial system, 
can be further demonstrated with the Mundell-Fleming trilemma50, whereby any economy is 
limited by the choice between two of the three factors of capital mobility, monetary policy 
autonomy and foreign currency price setting. Embedding one’s economy with global markets 
necessitates capital mobility and a freely floating currency (ie, no intervention). This leaves the 
only policy choice of interest rate setting, giving central banks influence on both the domestic 
economy and the international markets, as interest rates are inherently tied to both capital flows 
                                                          
46 Berman, S., McNamara, K., “From the Archives: Bank on democracy”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999; 
accessed here; a UK perspective can be found here.  
47 Ma, Y., & Li, S., “Bayesian estimation of China’s monetary policy transparency: a new Keynesian approach”, 
Economic Modeling, Dec 2014 
48 Also note articles: “Covert operations”, The Economist, 22 November 2014; accessed here;  
49 Fernandez, D., Goradia, K., “2014 survey of Central Bank Communication: the gap narrows but the Fed still sets 
the standard”, Barclays, November 2014 
50 Borne of Mundell, R., “Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates", 
Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science 29 (4): 475–485, 1963 and Fleming, J. M., "Domestic financial 
policies under fixed and floating exchange rates", 1962 IMF Staff Papers 9: 369–379. doi:10.2307/3866091 
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and exchange rate determination51. Capital flows may take longer to take effect, but the impact 
on the foreign exchange market is immediate. Evidence of the latter is seen by the Fed 
announcement on the USD, the ECB announcement on the EUR and the BOJ announcement on 
the JPY. The former can also be seen in last year’s “taper tantrum”, where S&P 500 and MSCI 
Asia ex-Japan index saw a negative move of 7% and 10% respectively over the course of one 
month.  
Appendix, Table H depicts the relative size of the PBoC’s balance sheet to that of the Fed, ECB 
and BOJ, and we note that the PBoC is the largest amongst the four. Despite the moves in 
Chinese benchmark rates and recent volatility in its stock market, international markets have been 
relatively protected from these flows given the lack of capital mobility. However, with the opening 
up of the capital account, the actions of the PBoC will be of much greater significance in the years 
to come, likely of greater impact than the Fed.  
In addition to the PBoC’s inexperience in policy making, communication and transparency, we 
also need be aware of the political implications of the significant role of an authoritarian-affiliated 
institution. If we question the political legitimacy of central banks in democracies, what of the 
legitimacy of a central bank in a non-democratic nation? We can otherwise interpret the 
international financial markets as handing over greater control of the system to the PBoC, and 
China’s neighbors are unlikely to have much say in the country’s policy making, despite the 
likelihood of being disproportionately affected.  
We are of the opinion that the prominence of the PBoC is likely to rise in the coming decades, 
especially if capital account liberalization forges ahead. Given its outsized impact beyond its 
borders, it is important that its neigbors be able to engage China in a manner in which their 
interests can be taken into consideration, as failure could lead to unwanted impacts their 
respective domestic economies. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we attempt to reverse the second image to anticipate the international sources of 
change in domestic politics. We do this by examining the changes that China’s neighbors will see 
as China liberalized its capital account. We looked at the future for Hong Kong as an IFC, and 
believe that whilst it is not threatened at the moment, it will need to carve out suitable niches for 
itself, or diversify its capabilities. Although economically, the adoption of the RMB as its 
fundamental currency would be a key solution, it would likely be met with political challenges. 
Given China’s relative size, free capital flows are likely to lead to prolonged valuation distortions 
and pricing volatility for the region. As a result, its Asian counterparts may need to further build 
up their already large currency reserves. USD supply issues aside, this could place inflationary 
pressure on the US, forcing other unintended consequence in terms of monetary and fiscal 
policies. 
Lastly, we examine the increasingly significant role that the PBoC is likely to play in the coming 
decades, as the Mundell-Fleming trilemma would attribute it more influential policy scope. This 
                                                          
51 In that global capital should flow to where one can earn higher rates of returns (i.e. higher policy rates), all else 
equal; and that the determination of tomorrow exchange rate is based on today’s price discounted by the 
expected interest rate. 
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power will extend beyond its borders, given the impact that free capital flows have on the global 
markets.  
These risks are significant, and will have much impact on regional economies and systems. If 
there was ever a case of “too big to fail”, China could become that, just as any large economy. 
Thus it will be in everyone’s interest for China’s system to improve at a controlled pace. As noted 
in Kapstein and Converse (2014), transitioning democracies (if we dare to think China is on some 
path to becoming a democracy) need institutional strength to ensure their survival. However, we 
face greater economic and political volatility in this era, and if we want China and the region to 
prosper, we need to give China the time, support and collaboration it needs to ensure the country’s 
institutions are well built, with the absorbers needed in times of volatility.  
If there is one lesson to be learnt from the recent GFC, is that our current monetary and financial 
system is flawed and that our economies are much more interconnected now than fifty years ago. 
Much work remains to be done in improving our global system (Blancard et al 2012), and whilst 
China and other emerging economies should play a large role in ensuring this, it is also the 
responsibility of the global financial system to ensure that new entrants are ushered in in a timely 
manner, and not on an ideological basis. Just as with the implementation of any new system, one 
should test, re-test and test again, before putting it in place. All actors within and between each 
system need to work more closely and better than ever before to ensure the health and stability 
of the global system.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A: China’s total system loans relative to the US; corresponding M2 
and GDP growth 
  China US   China  
  RMB bn USD bn USD bn   M2 (%) 
GDP growth 
(%) 
2014 16,413.30 2,644.15 7,930.20   12.2 7.3 
2013 17,290.40 2,856.78 7,382.80   13.59 7.6 
2012 15,763.10 2,528.16 7,224.30   13.83 7.9 
2011 12,828.60 2,036.38 6,907.00   13.61 8.9 
2010 14,019.10 2,127.43 6,757.90   19.72 9.8 
2009 13,910.40 2,037.53 6,660.20   27.68 10.7 
2008 6,980.20 1,022.67 7,248.40   17.82 6.8 
2007 5,966.30 817.63 6,779.00   16.7 11.2 
2006 4,269.60 547.03 6,102.20   16.94 10.4 
2005 3,000.80 371.84 5,445.40   17.57 9.9 
2004 2,862.90 345.91 4,837.30   14.63 9.5 
2003 3,411.30 412.16 4,373.40   19.6 9.9 
2002 2,011.20 242.99 4,145.70   16.8 8.1 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg 
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Table B: China: Government’s debt obligations 
Category of creditors 
 
 
(Value in RMB 100 mn; as of end 2012) 
Government 
guarantee 
responsibility 
Possible 
government 
rescue 
responsibility 
Possible 
governmental 
debts 
Total 
Debts 
Local gov’t bonds 6,146.28 489.74 0 6,636.02 
Enterprise bonds 4,590.09 808.62 3,428.66 8,827.37 
Medium-term paper 575.44 344.82 1,019.88 1,940.14 
Short-term financing paper 123.53 9.13 222.64 355.3 
Bond issuance 11,658.67 1,673.58 5,124.66 18,456.91 
Bank loans 55,252.45 19,085.18 26,849.76 10,1187.4 
Build and transfer 12,146.3 465.05 2,152.16 14,763.51 
Amounts payable 7,781.9 90.98 701.89 8,574.77 
Trust financing 7,620.33 2,527.33 4,104.67 14,252.33 
Borrowings by other entities or individuals 6,679.41 552.79 1,159.39 8,391.59 
Money-advanced construction, delayed 
payment 
3,269.21 12.71 476.67 3,758.59 
Financing by securities, insurance industry 
and other financial institutions 
2,000.29 309.93 1,055.91 3,366.13 
State bonds, foreign debts and other 
financial re-lending 
1,326.21 1,707.52 0 3,033.73 
Financing lease 751.17 193.05 1,374.72 2,318.94 
Fund-raising 373.23 37.65 393.89 804.77 
TOTAL 108,859.17 2,6655.77 43,393.72 17,8908.7 
Source: National Audit Office of China 
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Table C: Equity market turnover and average days turnover assuming a 
USD38.4bn capital inflow 
  Value turned over (USD mn) Days turnover 
Japan            21,323  1.80 
New Zealand                 102  378.19 
Hong Kong, China              4,719  8.14 
Singapore                 559  68.73 
Australia              3,540  10.86 
Mongolia                      0  3,031,321.16 
Korea              4,948  7.77 
Indonesia                 360  106.73 
Vietnam                    74  522.47 
Bangladesh                 137  279.65 
Sri Lanka                      7  5333.15 
India              1,368  28.08 
Lao PDR                      0  383,015.74 
Malaysia                 265  144.81 
Philippines                 145  264.31 
Thailand              1,171  32.82 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Table D: Bond market size relative to 1% move in China’s foreign 
exchange reserve 
USD bn Sovereign 
China FX as % 
of market Corporate 
China FX as % 
of market 
Japan  8,292.17  0.46%     679.74  5.65% 
New Zealand         
Hong Kong, China     109.49  35.09%        84.74  45.35% 
Singapore     146.51  26.23%        94.55  40.645% 
Australia         
Korea     701.21  5.48%  1,001.60  3.83% 
Indonesia     105.50  36.42%        17.99  213.61% 
Vietnam       40.06  95.93%          0.63  6100.03% 
Malaysia     184.99  20.77%     130.54  29.43% 
Philippines       87.09  44.12%        17.17  223.82% 
Thailand     211.15  18.20%        70.17  54.76% 
Source: Asian Bonds Online 
 
Table E: Countries’ external debt and their breakdown 
  
Total 
bonds 
(USD bn) % Foreign 
% Govt 
issued 
% banks 
issued 
% corporate 
issued 
Indonesia 190.12 35.0% 55.1% 4.9% 40.0% 
Japan 9,129.41 1.7% 26.5% 59.9% 13.6% 
Korea 1,862.13 8.6% 18.7% 42.8% 38.6% 
Malaysia 349.57 9.7% 18.4% 46.7% 35.0% 
Philippines 151.24 31.1% 74.7% 3.5% 21.8% 
Singapore 294.34 18.1%   71.8% 28.2% 
Thailand 297.62 5.5% 6.3% 54.0% 39.6% 
Source: Asian Bonds Online 
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Table F: Chinn-Ito (2006) financial openness ranking for Asian countries 
Country Score 
Myanmar 0 
Bangladesh 0.163896 
Bhutan 0.163896 
Sri Lanka 0.163896 
India 0.163896 
Lao PDR 0.163896 
Malaysia 0.163896 
Nepal 0.163896 
Pakistan 0.163896 
Philippines 0.163896 
Thailand 0.163896 
China 0.163896 
Indonesia 0.411093 
Vietnam 0.411093 
Korea, Rep. 0.714062 
Australia 0.818218 
Mongolia 0.836104 
Japan 1 
New Zealand 1 
Hong Kong, China 1 
Singapore 1 
Source: Chinn and Ito (2006) 
 
Table G: Countries’ foreign exchange reserves relative to the size of their 
economies 
  2004 1996 
Japan 27.4% 4.8% 
New Zealand   8.5% 
Hong Kong SAR, China 112.9% 40.0% 
Singapore 85.0% 79.8% 
Australia 3.7% 4.3% 
Korea, Rep. 25.7% 5.7% 
Indonesia 12.6% 8.5% 
Vietnam 18.4% 7.0% 
Malaysia 35.5% 27.7% 
Philippines 28.0% 14.2% 
Thailand 42.0% 21.2% 
Source: World Bank 
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Table H: Central Banks: relative asset size 
 
(USD bn) PBOC Fed ECB BOJ 
Jun-15 5,438.02  4,495.06  2,833.12  2,828.70  
End 2014 5,449.12  4,497.66  2,617.93  2,505.10  
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